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COMMUNITY PROPERTY :
By.MYRON H. BRIGHT*
P ENDING in this State is a proposal which would convert
North Dakota from a common law property State to one
where husband and wife would hold property acquired after
marriage in common under a community property system. Pe-
titions have been circulated by supporters of the plan under
the initiative procedure' to enable the measure to be acted
upon by the voters.2
The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the general
theories and concepts of the community property principle and
to indicate some of the problems that may arise from the en-
actment of community property laws upon our present method
and concept of holding, managing and controlling property,
both real and personal.
Holding property under a community concept, or in com-
mon, differs fundamentally from the common law. notions of
ownership. Under the proposed law, only property acquired by
husband and wife during marriage would be affected. Section
3 of the proposed enactment provides:
"All property acquired by either husband or wife during
marriage and after the effective date of this act, except that
which is the separate property of either as hereinbefore de-
fined, ,shall be deemed the community or common property of
the husband and wife, and each shall be vested with an un-
divided one-half interest therein ... "
This is a departure from the traditional concept of the wife's
rights in property. Under-English common law, by marriage
the husband and wife become one person 3 and that person
for all practical purposes was the husband. By this theory of
tThis article was written prior to the 1948 changes to the Federal tax laws,
)roviding for tax splitting between husband and wife. The North Dakota pro-
posal for a community property law has been withdrawn by its sponsors between
the writing and publication of this work.
Ed. Note: Publication of this article is continued in spite of the above devel-
opments because much of its subject matter remains of general legal interest.
" Member of the Minnesota and North Dakota Bars. Associate, Wattam, Vogel
and Vogel, Fargo, N. D.
I Initiative procedure, Article II Section 25, N. D. Const.
2 Part of the title of the petition reads: "Petition for the initiation of a law
relating to husband and wife and their property; to make provision for a com-
munity property law; to provide that the act shall apply to husbands and wives
and their property subsequent to the effective date of the act ... "
This proposal, if there are sufficient signers, of the petition, will be placed on
the Primary Ballot for the June 29, 1948, election.
3 See 26 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, Sect. 3.
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unity of the husband and wife, a married woman was under
a complete disability to act as a legal person. 4 By stages she
was emancipated from her previous disabilities under so-
called "Married Women's Acts" or "Married Women's Prop-
erty Acts." Today, in most States, a married woman makes
her own contracts, acquires and sells property, sues and is
sued and may generally be said to be equal under the law with
the male of the species r and may hold free from any disabil-
ity of coverture as a feme sole.
According to the common law, the husband upon his mar-
riage was given a freehold estate or interest in the property
that the wife was seized of in fee.6 In addition the husband
had a right of curtesy in the estate of the wife.
7
The wife had no vested interest in her husband's estate. By
common law, her right in her husband's property was limited
to dower of the -real estate.s She had no right or interest in
the personal. property of her husband.'
Under common law concepts and under the present system
in this State a husband or wife may generally be said to have
the right to own real or personal property free of the other.'0
This is subject to the usual qualifications with regard tb home-
steads. 11 Our constitutional safeguards would seem to protect
this vested property right and ability of both spouses to ac-
quire, possess and protect their own property without a right
of legal interference by the marital partner."
The idea behind community property is that both the hus-
band and wife contribute equally to the prosperity of the rela-
tionship. It is in nature similar to a partnership. However,
neither idleness, wasteful habits or physical incapacity will
4 Thompson v. Thompson, (1910) 218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180,
30 LRA (NS). 1153; See 26 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, Sect. 3 and cases cited.
" 20 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, Sect. 20 and cases cited. See Fitzmaurice v.
Fitzmaurice, (1932) 62 N. D. 191 at 198, 242 N.W. 526 for discussion of North
Dakota statutory law touching capacity, rights and obligations of married women
respecting property, contracts and torts.
.See Bank of America v. Banks, (1880) 101 U. S. 240, 25 L. Ed. 850; 26 Am.
Jur., Husband and Wife, Sect. 39, 55 and cases cited.
7 See 15 Am. Jur., Curtesy p. 269.
8 17 Am. Jur., Dower p. 649.
9 26 Am. Jur. 20, Husband and Wife, Sect. 40.
10 Dower as well as Curtesy are abolished in this State. 1943 N. D. Code
14-0709, 56-0102.
11 1943 N. D. Code 30-1602, 30-1604.
12 N. D. Const. Art. I, Sect. 1 provides: "All men are by nature equally free
and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting
property and reputation . . . and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
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deprive any of the marital partners from an equal share of
the property gains during the marriage. 13 There is a difference
between holding property in common under a community prop-
erty act and possessing an estate in common or in joint ten-
ancy as is permitted by North Dakota statutes.' If a husband
and wife hold as joint tenants or as tenants in common, each
has an undivided interest which may be separated from the
entire estate by the unilateral act of the parties. Under a
community property concept, property acquired during mar-
riage is owned by both by virtue of the fact of marriage
alone.1 5 The estate created is an incident of marriage not of
design or intent of the parties.
Community property is not known to the common law.
Courts generally say that it is founded on the civil law sys-
tems of Europe.16 Some of our States inherited the system
from Spain or Mexico; in others it was adopted.17 While the
origins of the system are not always satisfactorily traced, the
best opinion indicates that the idea of the present "marital
share" originated among Germanic tribes where the wife was
entitled to 1/3 of the gain during coverture. Some authorities
seem to think that there were beginnings of this doctrine in
England before the Norman Coquest but that under the French
invaders, the origins were lost. The community system was
introduced into parts of the Roman Empire including what is,
now Spain and part of France during the fifth century, and
was brought into sections of America settled by the colonists
from those countries.' In California, Louisiana and Texas the
system of community holdings was inherited and the States
continued with the inherited systems subject to such statutory
changes as proved desirable.1 The system was adopted in
Washington, Nevada, Idaho and Arizona. These seven States
and New Mexico constituted the original Community property
States.
In comparatively recent years Oklahoma decided to join its
13 11 Am. Jur., Community Property, Sect. 5.
14 1943 N. D. Code 47-0206, joint tenancy defined; Code 47-0208, tenancy in
common defined.
15 11 Am. Jur., Community Property, Sect. 70; Commr. of Int. Rev. v. Harmon
(1944) 323 U. S. 44, 89 L. Ed. 60, 65 S. Ct. 103.
16 11 Am. Jur., Community Property, Sect. 3.
17 See Spreckels v. Spreckels, (1897) 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228, 36 L. R. A. 447,
58 Am. St. Rep. 170.
18 See Wilcox v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1947) 55 A (2d) 521, 524, 11 Am.
Jur., Community Property, Sect. 3.
19 See note 17, supra.
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Texas neighbor as a community property holding State, some
say to arrest an exodus of Oklahoma millionaires for reasons
that will be subsequently explained. During the past year
Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon and Pennsylvania joined the com-
munity band wagon.
The reason is comparatively simple. Taxes.
INCOME TAXATION UNDER COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The advantage of the community property system from the
income tax standpoint is the United States Supreme Court
determination that a tax on the net income of every individual
is a tax on ownership of that income -and taxation follows
the ownership.
Poe v. Seaborn " is the leading case enunciating the above
doctrine. There in a suit for refund of income taxes by a hus-
band, the Court held that under the community property laws
of Washington the wife had a vested property right in com-
munity property equal with that of her husband. This right
extended to the income of the community including the salary
and wages of either even though the husband had broad powers
of control. The laws of the State controlled the determination
of ownership. Since husband and wife owned half of the earn-
ings they could split the community income between them for
tax purposes.
Goodell v. Koch 21 decided that the wife's interest under the
Arizona law was vested. Of the same import concerning the
Texas community property laws was Hopkins v. Bacon.
Bender v. Pfaff construed the Louisiana system similarly.L
U. S. v. Robbins 24 held that the California law (prior to its
amendment in 1927) did not qualify to enable a taxpayer to
split his income since the wife there had a mere expectancy
while living and as such the income from community property
could be taxed solely to the husband. By dictum the Court
indicated that even if the wife's interest were vested, the hus-
band's power of control over community assets would render
him liable for the full tax against his earned income. This
dictum was not followed in the later cases. In U. S. v. Mal-
colm 25 the California provisions (after amendment in 1927)
LO (1930) 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. Ed. 239, 51 S. Ct. 58.
21 (1930) 282 U. S. 118, 51 S. Ct. 62, 75 L. Ed. 247.
22 (1930) 282 U. S. 122, 51 S. Ct. 64, 75 L. Ed. 249.
23 (1930) 282 U. S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64, 75 L. Ed. 252.
21 (1926) 269 U. S. 315, 46 S. Ct. 148, 70 L. Ed. 285.
23 (1931) 282 U. S. 792, 51 S. Ct. 184, 75 L. Ed. 714.
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were held sufficient to permit income tax splitting, since the
wife's interest had become vested.
Oklahoma was the first of the non traditional community
property States to attempt to foist the community property
concept upon, its citizens. The 1939 community property laws
adopted an optional system. The husband and wife could elect
to come under the law or not. The act was held ineffective for
income tax splitting purposes 20 under the doctrine that op-
tional features of the law in effect consisted of a contract to
assign future income which was not effective to transfer the
incidence of a tax.--, The Court clearly pointed out that in order
for the community system to operate effectively for income
tax purposes the earned income must be transferred as an
incidence of marriage by the inveterate policy of the State and
not consent. The Oklahoma act was subsequently changed in
1945 and omitted the consent feature.
The real benefit of the community property system is that
high surtax rates may be avoided by having husband and wife
file separate returns and split their income. However, a return
in a community property State may be joint or separate. In
general a return having once been filed may not be changed
from one basis to the other at the will of the taxpayer after
the expiration of the filing period. ' s
Under the 1947 tax rates the following savings are indi-
cated under the community property system.
2
1
Taxable Income Taxes in Income Taxes in Savings in taxes
Income States that are States that are for man and wife
(Exemptions not Community Community in Community
Deducted) Property States Property States Property States
$ 3,000. $ 589. $ 570. $ 19.
4,000. 798. 760. 38.
5,000. 1,045. 979. 76.
10,000. 2,508. 2,090. 418.
12,000. 3,230. 2,584. 646.
16,000. 4,940. 3,724. 1,216.
24,000. 9,082. 6,470. 2,622.
30,000. 12,559. 8,987. 3,752.
50.000. 25.579. 19,285. 6,194.
100,000. 63,954. 50,958. 12,996.
200,000. 148,979. 127,908. 21,071.
26 Commr. of Int. Rev. v. Harmon, (1944) 323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103, 89
L. Ed. 60.
27 Under the doctrine of Lucas v. Earl, (1930) 281 U. S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 74
L. Ed. 731.
28 Champlin v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 10th cir. 1935) 78 F (2d) 905;
Morris v. Commr. of int. Rev. (C. C. A. 2nd cir. 1930) 40 F (2d) 504.
29 Reproduced from Congressional Record, March 3, 1947
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High income bracket taxpayers will effect substantial tax
savings. A community property law will benefit only a small
portion of the taxpayers and does not save income taxes unless
a married man without dependents earns over $3,300. per year
or one with two dependents earns over $4,400. per year.
THEORIES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Not all community property states are similar nor is the
judicial construction of their laws consistent at all times. Ap-
parently there are four different concepts of ownership of
community property. Prior to the amendment of its statute,
the California theory was that a wife did not have a vested
interest in the community but rather her interest was in the
nature of an incumbrance on her husband's ownership.-"° Wash-
ington on the other hand theorized that the husband and the
wife constitute an entity in which both have equal rights and
interest, although the husband is constituted by the statute
as the managing agent of the community. However, his power
of alienation of community property does not cloak him with
a larger proprietary interest in the community property than
the wife has. His agency is for the entity and not the individ-
uals.31
Idaho has a double ownership idea and the interests of the
spouses are equal and of the same sort.:' Whereas in Washing-
ton neither spouse alone owns the community property, in
Idaho, both own it. Each has an individual one-half of the
property. In Texas the trust theory is advocated. : ':- The inter-
ests of the two spouses are beneficially equal, but the legal
title is in the husband, the wife's niterest being vested but
equitable.3
4
SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Whether property is separate or community under our pro-
posed Act has major importance for tax and other purposes.
Where the property involved constitutes income, if it is sep-
arate, it is taxed to the owner, while if community it may be
split. On divorce or dissolution or death, the characterization
of property in either category has important consequences.
30 Spreckels v. Spreckels, (1897) 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228, 36 L. R. A. 497, 58
Am. St. Rep. 170.
31 Evans, Ownership of Comnui itg Property, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 47, 51 (1921).
:2 Id. at 55.
::, Id. at 62.
34 Id. at 47.
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Separate property under the proposed North Dakota Act is
defined as follows:
Of the husband: All property, both real and personal, owned
or claimed by him before marriage or before the effective date
of this act, whichever is later, and that required afterwards
by gift, devise or descent, or received as compensation for
personal injuries.3
Of the wife: All property, both real and personal, owned or
claimed by her before marriage or before the effective date of
the act, whichever is later, and that acquired afterwards by
gift, devise or descent, or received as compensation for per-
sonal injuries.3 6 All other property acquired after marriage
(or after the effective date of the act, whichever is later)
except that which is the separate property of either falls into
the community category.
This classification is not as clear and distinct as might
appear on first reading. In general property purchased with
separate funds remains separate property irrespective of the
time of such purchase.'7 On the other hand, if property is
separate in its inception, the fact that a mortgage is paid on
it from community funds with no intent to change the man-
ner or type of ownership will not make the property com-
munity to any extent.-0 As between two community property
States, the State where the property is located determines
whether rent and income from the land is community or not.:,
States differ on their view of whether income from separate
property falls into the community category or not. The older
community property States of Arizona, California, Nevada,
New Mexico and Washington hold that the rents, issues and
profits of separate property constitute separate income. 40 On
the other hand, in Idaho, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas such
income is community and can be split. In Idaho the rents,
issues and profits of the wife's separate property will not be
community if there is a provision in the deed of conveyance
:15 Sect. 1, proposed Act.
31; Sect. 3, proposed Act.
37 Noble v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 10th cir. 1943) 138 F (2d) 721.
.38 In re Lissner's Estate, (Cal. App. 1938) 81 P (2d) 448, payments of an
-obligation on separate property with community funds; see Rogan v. Delaney
(C. C. A. 9th cir. 1940) 110 F (2d) 336; cf. Walker v. Fowler (1930 Wash.) 285 P.
649; wife paid % of mortgage on community property with separate funds, held,
she owned Y4. of the property separately and the balance remained community
property.
:19 Commr. of Int. Rev. v. Skaggs, (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 721.
40 Discussed in 3 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Sect. 19.16.
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that they are for her separate use and benefit.4 1 Apparently
under the North Dakota proposed act, income from separate
property would be community. This would be apparent from
Section 4 of the proposed North Dakota act since the wife has
control over that portion of the community property consist-
ing of rents, interest, dividends and other income from her
separate property. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in con-
struing that State's enactment, indicated that the legislative
intent was that income from separate property was commu-
nity since otherwise the avowed purpose of the statute to
reduce the amount of federal income taxes payable by mar-
ried persons would be largely frustated.2
To be distinguished, however, is income from separate
property and gains from separate property. The latter is sep-
arate.4 ' Profits from toil and talent is to be distinguished from
mere subdivision of property into lots. Spontaneous output
or natural growth of the land as trees and hay, etc., are not
community and segregation from the soil does not make them
so unless done with community funds or labor.
44
Assuming the above doctrine to be true, if the community
property law were to be enacted on September 1 of this.year,
only three months of the income acquired after the law be-
came effective could be split.4
5
In States where income from separate property remains
separate, there are sometimes difficult problems in the appor-
tionment of income between that arising from the fruits of the
labor of one of the marital partners and that arising from
the invested capital as separate property.
4,
In general separate property is that acquired from separate
funds, gains on separate property, gifts, legacies and compen-
sation for personal injury. All other property is community.
4 7
41 Ibid.
42 See Wilcox v. Penn. Mut- Life Ins. Co., (1947) 55 A (2d) 521.
4:1 See Commr. of Int. Rev. v. Skaggs, (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1941) 122 F (2d) 721;
McFaddin v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 570. Welder
v. Commr. of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 583.
44 See Welder v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 583.
McFaddin v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 570.
4,. See Wrightsman v, Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1940) 111 F (2d)
227.
46 See Todd v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 8th cir. 1945) 153 F (2d) 553;
In Pereira v. Pereira, (Cal. 1909) 103 P 488 the Court indicated that where
income from separate property remains separate the capital contribution to the
earnings should be computed according to the usual terms of interest on long
term obligations. 3 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 40, sec. 19.16.
47 Section 3, proposed Act.
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In addition under the proposed Act
"... all the effects which the husband and wife possess at
the time the marriage may be dissolved shall be regarded as
common effects or gains unless the contrary be satisfactorily
proved." 48
It would appear from the latter clause that a rebuttable
presumption is created as to the status of property as between
husband and wife at the dissolution of the marital status.
In Welder vs. Commr. of Int. Rev.49 the Court held that the
character of separate property never leaves but follows it
through all of its mutations so long as it can be traced. But
where separate and community property are commingled so
that the identity cannot be traced and it is impossible to dis-
tinguish one from the other, the whole will then be considered
community. ° The Court will presume that all property ac-
quired after marriage is community and this is true irrespec-
tive of the opinion of either spouse that the property was
separate or community. 5
Trust income may also be split even though the trust is
created and managed in a non-community property State pro-
vided that the beneficiary is a resident of a community prop-
erty State.5 2 An interest in a trust is an equitable right in rem
and the income received therefrom is community property.
This is true in the case of a spendthrift trust also.' :
If property is purchased partially with community and par-
tially with separate funds, the ownership is apportioned be-
tween the separate and community estate.54
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Under the proposed North Dakota law, the wife is to have
the management and control and may dispose of her separate
property, both real and personal, and that portion of the com-
munity property consisting of her earnings; all rents, interest,
dividends and other income from her separate property, and
48 Ibid.
49 (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 570.
50 Fellows v. Fellows, (Cal. App. 1930) 289 P 887. Parker v. Parker, (Wash.
1922) 207 P 1062.
5' In re Wilson's Estate, (Nev. 1936) 53 P (2d) 339; Welder v. Commr. of Int.
Rev., (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 583.
52 Commr. of Int. Rev. v. Porter, (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 566;
Cornmr. of Int. Rev. v. Snowden, (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1945) 148 F (2d) 569.
53 Commr. of Int. Rev. v. Terry, (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1934) 69 F (2d) 969; Comnir.
of Int. Rev. v. Wilson, (C. C. A. 5th cir. 1935) 76 F (2d) 766.
54 Walker v. Fowler, (Wash. 1930) 285 P. 649.
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all other common or community property, the title to which
stands in her name. The husband shall have the management
and control and may dispose of his separate property, both
real and personal, and all community property, the manage-
ment, control and disposition of which is not conferred upon
the wife under the provisions of the act.5', The act leaves un-
said the extent of such powers of control that either spouse
may exercise over that segment of the community property
under their separate control, or the remedies of either spouse
for the wrongful act of the other in dealing with the commu-
nity holdings.
The spouse controlling and managing the community estate
is only the statutory agent for the community.-- While as a
general rule it may be stated that the husband as the head of
the community has broad powers of management and control
of the community estate and in many respects may act with
respect to the community property as though it were his very
own, 57 this doctrine is not without its limitations. The hus-
band as agent of the community may not act in fraud of his
wife's vested rights.5 8
This particular phase of the law has been fraught with dif-
ficulties and problems and the answers have varied in states
by reason of the difference in theory of community holdings
and applicable statutes. In Garrazi v. Dastas '11 the Court held
there was no liability nor responsibility upon the husband to
the wife for his having squandered the community assets. The
Court pointed out that the very foundation of the community
and its efficacious existence depends on the power of the hus-
band during the marriage over the community. In the absence
of fraud or express legislative restriction the husband may
deal with the assets as the owner.
In Occidental Life Ins. vs. Powers,ls0 a Washington case, a
husband had secured a life insurance policy on his own life
with a right to change the beneficiary at any time. Originally
the wife was listed as the beneficiary. Subsequently the hus-
band named his mother and his private secretary. The pre-
55 Sect. 4, proposed Act.
56 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, (Wash. 1937) 74 P (2d) 27; Commr. of
Int. Rev. v. Harmon, (C. C. A. 10th cir. 1943) 139 F (2d) 211, reversed on other
grounds, 323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103, 89 L. Ed. 60.
57 11 Am. Jur., community property, Sect. 50, 53, 55.
58 See Goodell v. Koch, (1930) 282 U. S. 118, 75 L. Ed. 247, 51 S. Ct. 62.
59 (1906) 204 U. S. 64, 27 S. Ct. 224, 51 L. Ed. 369 (Puerto Rico).
60 (1937) 74 P. (2d) 27.
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miums were paid with his earnings, community funds. Fol-
lowing his death, the wife claimed the proceeds as against
the named beneficiaries, maintaining that since the policy was
paid for with community funds, it was fraud for the husband
to give community assets away without the wife's consent.
The Court held that the husband was the manager but not the
owner of the community funds and could not give the com-
munity property, even to his mother, without the consent of
the wife. The freedom of 'control as statutory agent was lim-
ited to a freedom to act ony for the benefit of the community.
The wife was awarded all of the proceeds of the policy. In
California it was held that a similar gift was valid as to the
1/2 of the husband's interest in the community gift.6 Under
the doctrine of the above cases, at least under the rule in
Washington, there may not be a valid gift of community prop-
erty to the members of the family of either spouse without
the other's consent.
What can be done about a wrongful gift prior to dissolution
of the marriage? A dictum in re Coffey's Estate 02 indicates
that the husband may be restrained in his transactions with
community property which are inimical to the economic wel-
fare of the community. 6 Generally, however, there is no ac-
counting between the husband and the wife for dissipation or
fraudulent conversion of the community assets until the com-
munity's dissolution by divorce or death.6 4 Where the husband
having control of community funds, fraudulently invests a
portion in his own separate property, he will be held to ac-
count to the community for such misappropriation on divorce.
The Court may award an innocent party to the divorce a
greater share of the community assets.65
From a practical standpoint, problems in control and man-
agement or mismanagement, as the case may be, will not be
decided by the Courts in the well ordered household. Where
the marriage is headed for divorce community property rights
may only serve to increase misunderstanding and complicate
the respective rights of each spouse upon settelement.
61 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, (1923 Cal. App.) 214 P. 61; Traveler's
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Fancher, (Cal. 1933) 26 P (2d) 482.
62 (Wash. 1938) 81 P (2d) 283.
63 See Johnson v. Nat'l Surety Co., (Cal. App. 1931) 5 P (2d) 39. Under Calif.
code the wife may have a remedy to protect the community property against the
inconsiderate and fraudulent acts of the husband.
64 Daniel v. Daniel, (Wash. 1919) 181 P 215, cf. Garazi v. Dastos note 59.
65 Falk v. Falk, (Cal. App. 1941) 120 P (2d) 715.
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Should the proposed community property law be enacted,
the husband may be placed in the anomolous situation of being
sued by his wife for misappropriating community property
but finding himself without a remedy for his wife's fraudu-
lent dealings with the community property under her control.
It is settled that a married woman may sue her husband in
tort in North Dakota but still undecided is the question






Section 5 of the proposed Act provides:
"The homestead, whether the separate property of the hus-
band or wife, or the community or common property of both
shall not be sold, encumbered or otherwise disposed of, except
in the manner provided by law prior to the enactment of this
act."
Apparently while the method of disposal is not intended to
be affected, the manner of holding the homestead property
will be governed by the other provisions of the act.
BANK DEPOSITS AND LIFE INSURANCE
Section 6 of the proposed act states:
"Any funds on deposit in any bank or banking institution,
whether in the name of the husband or wife, shall be pre-
sumed to be the separate property of the party in whose
name they stand regardless of who made the deposit, and
unless the said banks or banking institution is notified to the
contrary, it shall be governed accordingly in honoring checks
and orders against such account."
Section 7 of the proposed act relating to life insurance pro-
vides that,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this act, when the pro-
ceeds of, or payments under a policy or contract issued by a
life insurance company become payable and the company
makes payment thereof in accordance with the terms thereof,
or in accordance with the terms of any written assignment
thereof if the policy or contract has been assigned, such pay-
ment shall fully discharge the company from all claims under
such policy or contract unless, before such payment is made,
the company has received, at its home office, written notice
by or on behalf of some other person that such other person
UG Fitzinaurice v. Fitzmaurice, (1932) 62 N. D. 191, 242 N. W. 226.
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claims to be entitled to such payment or interest in the policy
or contract." "
Apparently the effect of these provisions will be to relieve
banks and life insurance companies from a wrongful payment
made in good faith and according to the policy contract or
bank deposit arrangement. These sections do not change the
relative rights of the spouses in that type of property.
Where a husband takes out a policy of life insurance pay-
able to his wife on his death, and paying the premiums dur-
ing his life from community funds, the wife receives an
inchoate gift from the husband of the proceeds of the policy
which become complete upon his death. The proceeds are her
separate property and upon her death immediately thereafter,
her heirs, and not the husband's, are entitled to share in this
portion of the estate.'
DEBTS
Section 8 of the proposed enactment provides as follows:
"That portion of the community property under the man-
agement, control and disposition of the wife or which stands
in her name shall be liable for debts contracted by the wife,
and for torts of the wife committed in the course of acquiring,
holding or managing such community property, but not other-
wise. That portion of the community property which is under
the management, control and disposition of the husband shall
be liable for debts contracted by the husband and for torts
of the husband committed in the course of acquiring, man-
aging, holding or disposing of the community property, but
not otherwise. The husband and wife, each of them, shall be
entitled to the exemptions to which they, or either of them,
are entitled under existing laws. All debts created by the
husband or wife after marriage or after the effective date of
this act, whichever is later, shall be regarded as community
debts, unless the contrary is satisfactorily proved."
Section 9 reads as follows:
"No creditor shall have recourse to the community property
for the payments of debts or liabilities created by either the
husband or the wife, except as provided in section 8 of this
act: Provided, that any creditor may satisfy his claim or
demand out of the community property which was under the
management, control and disposition of the spouse incurring
the indebtedness or liability at the time the debt or liability
6 For an example of the insurer's refusal to pay upon being notified that the
premiums were paid from community assets, see Wilcox v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. (1947) 55 A (2d) 521.
I's In re Lissner's Estate, (Cal. App. 1938) 81 P (2d) 448.
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was controlled or created, and which has been subsequently
conveyed or transferred to the other spouse and is under the
management, control and disposition of said other spouse,
without proof that said creditor relied upon said community
property in advancing said credit, but without prejudice to
the rights of the third party purchasers, encumbrances, or
other creditors or grantees; and provided further, that the
husband or wife on paying community debts shall, as between
themselves, charge the same against community property."
It would appear that community property managed by the
wife would be liable for her contracted debts and torts com-
mitted in the course of holding or managing such property.
Community property under management or control of the hus-
band is liable for the husband's contracted debts and torts
committed in the acquisition or management of the commu-
nity property. While all debts acquired after marriage are
presumed community debts there is no specific statutory pro-
vision enabling the creditor to satisfy his claim out of com-
munity assets, irrespective of who controls the property. Pre-
sumably the assets to be reached would depend on whether
the husband or the wife incurred the debt. It would seem that
from the statutory language community property is not liable
for tort liabilities of either the husband or wife not incurred
in the management of community property. If the above be
the rule with regard to debts, creditors will have their rights
severely curtailed. In this respect it may be asked, What will
be the effect of our judgment lien statutes as affecting real
property standing in the name of either the husband or the
wife which forms part of the community holding?
Sections 8 and 9 are not clear in their effect or application.
The rules regarding the liability of community property
and separate property for obligations and torts vary in states
with the community property system depending on the par-
ticular provisions of the statutes and the court's determina-
tion of the applicable rule. In general creditors' rights have
not been materially affected. Ordinarily community property
is liable for community debts.
70
69 N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, 28-2013.
70 For a general discussion of this problem see 11 Am. Jur., Community Prop-
erty, Sect. 64-69; Bortle v. Osborne, (Wash. 1930) 285 P 425; Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. Clark, (Wash. 1927) 258 P 35.
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TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY
Section 10 of the proposed act provides as follows:
"The husband may give, grant, bargain, sell or convey di-
rectly to his wife, and a wife may give, grant, bargain, sell
or convey directly to her husband, his or her community
property in esse. Every deed and conveyance made from the
husband to the wife or from the wife to the husband shall
operate to divest the property therein described of every claim
or deemed as community property to the extent herein pro-
vided, and shall vest the same in the grantee as the separate
property of the grantee: provided, that the deeds, conveyances
or transfers hereby authorized shall not affect any existing
equity in favor of creditors of the grantor at the time of such
transfer, gift or encumbrance."
In general it would appear that the community property
may be converted into separate property. In a number of the
older community property states, separate property of one
spouse may be converted by contract or deed into community
property or visa versa.7- And if community property is trans-
mitted by agreement of spouses into separate property of one
of the spouses, the income is taxable solely to the latter.2 In
McDonald v. Lambert,7: a New Mexico case, it was held that
an oral agreement was insufficient to change separate prop-
erty into community by mere will. Under the rule of that
jurisdiction, the marital partners are powerless to change the
status of the separate estate into community property. (Ac-
tually under the proposed enactment, the proposition whether
separate property may be converted into community is not
covered.) Under the California rule, it is well settled that the
spouses' separate property may be changed into community
property by an executed oral agreement that all property
owned by them at the time of marriage and subsequently
acquired shall be community property.7 4 In Washington the
rule seems to be that the husband and wife may by proper
agreement or conveyance, change their separate property into
community property and community property into separate
property, but whether it in fact has been changed depends on
four rules: (1) the-status of the property is to be determined
71 See Commr. of Int. Rev. v. Harmon, (1944) 323 U. S. 44, 54, 89 L. Ed. 60,
66, 65 S. Ct. 137 and cases cited; Stewart v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 5th
cir. 1938) 95 F (2d) 821.
72 Sparkman v. Commr. of Int. Rev., (C. C. A. 9th cir. 1940) 112 F (2d) 774;
Helvering v. Heckman (C. C. A. 9th cir. 1934) 70 F (2d) 985.
M (1938) 85 P (2d) 78.
74 Kenny v. Kenny, (Cal. 1934) 30 P (2d) 398.
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as of the date of acquisition; (2) the rule applies to real as
well as personal property; (3) if the property is once shown
to have been separate property, the presumption is that it
continues separate property until that presumption is over-
come by evidence; (4) property continues to be separate prop-
erty through all its changes and transitions as long as it can
be clearly traced and identified; (5) the rents, issues and
profits of separate property remain separate (in that state)."
With regard to the transfer of real property without the
joinder of the other spouse, this is handled by statute in a
number of jurisdictions where both are required to sign the
instrument.7 1 In absence of a statutory restriction, the hus-
band as head of the community and as general manager may
sell or dispose of the real property without the authority of
the wife. A deed from the husband where he holds the record
title is sufficient in most community property states except as
to homestead. The wife, however, has no such authority even
though the property be in her name, except as she may act
as the agent for her husband. In purchasing from a woman,
the buyer is bound to ascertain at his peril that the property
is her separate estate unless recitals appear in the conveyance
to her.7 7 The latter proposition may be questioned in North
Dakota in view of the provisions of Section 4 previously con-
sidered in the text at note 55.
DIVORCE
Section 11 of the proposed act reads:
"In the event of the dissolution of marriage by decree of
any Court of competent jurisdiction, the husband and wife
shall each be vested with an undivided one-half interest in
the community property as tenants in common, but nothing
herein shall prevent the Court from having the same powers
with respect to said property as to *other property of either
husband or wife. This section apparently does not interfere
with the powers of the Court over the property of married
persons, but does change the community estate into a tenancy
in common upon divorce."
PROCEDURE UPON DEATH
"Upon the death of the husband or wife, the surviving
spouse shall administer all community property in the same
V. State v. Sailors, (Wash. 1934) 39 P (2d) 397.
7 See Arnett v. Read, (1911) 220 U. S. 311, 31 S. Ct. 425, 55 L. Ed. 477.
77,Patton on Titles, (1938) Sect. 248.
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manner and with the same duties, privileges and authority asare vested in a surviving partner to administer and settle the
affairs of a partnership upon the death of the other partner.
The surviving husband or wife shall not be disqualified from
acting as executor or administrator of the estate of the de-
ceased husband or wife. The survivor of the husband or wife
shall pay out of the community property, except the home-
stead and exempt property, all debts of the community,
whether created by the husband or the wife. When all debts
of the community shall have been fully satisfied the survivor
shall transfer and convey to the administrator or executor of
the deceased one-half of the community property remaining
to be administered and distributed as other property of the
estate, either subject to the terms of the will of the deceased
or under the laws of descent and distribution as the case
may be, and thereafter all the interest of the surviving part-
ner in said community-shall be that of a tenant in common.
Any interest in a homestead so conveyed shall not be subject
to administration under the laws of this State, except in the
manner provided by law at the time of the enactment of this
act." 7
It would appear from this section, that the surviving spouse
shall first pay off the community debts. The community estate
remaining is to be equally divided. Presumably the laws of
intestate succession or the provisions of the will of the de-
ceased spouse would thereupon apply upon that aliquot por-
tion transferred to the administrator or executor. In intestacy
the amount of inheritance of the children would be materially
decreased. On the other hand, a surviving wife would mate-
rially benefit by this community property division. She would
secure one-half the community property, and her rights of
succession 79 would not be affected with resptct to the hus-
bands separate property, the homestead or the balance of the
community estate.80
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
Constitutional objections were raised and sustained in a
common law state that engrafted the principles of community
property upon its common law property doctrines. In Wilcox
vs. Penn. State Mut. Life Ins. Co.,", the Pennsylvania commu-
nity property act, similar to the proposed North Dakota en-
actment, was held void.
78 Sect. 16, proposed Act.
79 See N. D. Rev. Code 1943, 56-0104.
80 Neither spouse has any rights by dower or curtesy. N. D. Rev. Code, 1943.
14-0709, 56-0102.
81 (1947) 55 A (2d) 521.
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The Pennsylvania law was found wanting on three primary
grounds.
(a) The intent of the act was to make income taxes sepa-
rate estate community property. The right to ownership of
separate property includes the right to the fruits of that prop-
erty. Ownership and the profits from the land are one and
the same. The statutory provision making the profits com-
munity property violated the state constitutional concept that
"All men . . . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights,
among which are those . . . of acquiring, possession and pro-
tecting property." It may be noted that the North Dakota
Constitution has a similar provision. '
(b) As a second ground the Court found the statute so
vague, indefinite and uncertain in its terms as to render the
act incapable of being executed. The Court pointed out that
as community property each spouse is vested with an un-
divided one-half interest in the property according to the
tenor of the act, but all other provisions are inconsistent
therewith since each spouse has unrestricted control over the
same property which they would have owned had there been
no community property doctrine enacted. As owner of part of
the community property, one spouse may have no real inci-
dents of ownership at all where the control is in the other
spouse, and therefore in effect have only an illusory title or
interest.
(c) As a final blow the Court pronounced the act nugatory
because under the existing Pennsylvania law the wife could
have no remedy against her husband for wrongful disposition
or misappropriation of the community assets under his control.
The Court stated, "The community property law is not only
'vague, indefinite and uncertain' but so 'incomplete, conflict-
ing, and inconsistent in its provisions' that it is incapable
either of rational interpretation or of judicial enforcement
and consequently it must be held to be inoperative and void."
CONCLUSIONS
Community property will provide substantial tax savings
to upper income groups and will materially increase the
woman's rights to share in the gains made during matrimony.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the community
property system is exotic with respect to both our substan-
8*- N. D. Const., Art. 1, Sect. 1.
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tive and procedural law. It represents "a concept of property
that is entirely alien and foreign to that of the common law
as to the conjugal relationship and the marital rights in
property." 83
The proposed community property act leaves many ques-
tions unanswered and needs much clarification. Uncertainty
with respect to property .rights, and litigation with respect to
the solution of those problems will certainly arise.
It is submitted that if tax equality is desired, that solution
lies with our Congress. If a change is desired in the property
rights of husband and wife, then the matter should be given
careful study and our statute law changed and revised in all
details to accomplish the desired result.
- de Funiak, Principles of Community Property, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 4, Sect. 2.
